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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-2392
STANLEY BACONE;
JUDY BACONE, H/W
Appellants
v.
PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY;
TONY MILLER;
ANGELA ALLEN
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 01-CV-419)
District Court Judge: Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 15, 2004
Before: ALITO, AMBRO, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
1Nor is the conduct at issue severe enough to establish a hostile work environment
per se.  Cf. Becker v. Ulster County, 167 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (attempted
rape considered per se harassment).  
2
(Filed September 30, 2004)
PER CURIAM:
We need not review the background of this case because this opinion is only for
the benefit of the parties.  Plaintiff’s arguments challenging the District Court’s decisions
are without merit.  We affirm on all counts.  
First, considering all of the circumstances, Officer Bacone failed to raise a triable
issue of material fact over whether the evidence of sexual harassment was pervasive
enough to alter the terms of his employment.1  See Harris v. Forklife Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21-22 (1993); Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1997).  The behavior
at issue involved no more than four incidents during the span of two weeks, and though
they were offensive, they are not pervasive enough rise to the level of a Title VII
violation.  See, e.g., Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353 (7 th Cir. 1998).  In
addition, Officer Allen was not in a position of power relative to Officer Bacone.  See
Quantock v. Shared Marketing Services, Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2002).  
Even if the conduct at issue were sufficiently severe and pervasive, it ceased as
soon as Officer Bacone filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Housing Authority
(“PHA”).  A856, A859.  “[W]hen an employer’s response stops the harassment, there can
be no employer liability under Title VII.”  Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 427 (3d
2It appears that Chief Zappile did not learn of Bacone’s complaint until after he
reassigned him to operations.  This alone would vitiate the retaliation claim.  See Jones v.
School Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 415 (3d Cir. 1999); Krouse v. American Sterilizer
Co., 126 F.3d 494, 505 (3d Cir. 1997).  
3
Cir. 2001); Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Second, Officer Bacone failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the retaliation claim.  See Weston, 251 F.3d at 430 (describing prima facie case).  Sixteen
months after the PHA learned of Officer Bacone’s complaint and soon after he became
Chief of Police, Chief Zappile began stringently enforcing the PHA’s no-beard policy for
patrol officers.  A1020-21.  There is no evidence that he did so because of Bacone’s
sexual harassment complaint,2 and the record shows that at least three other officers were
required to shave their beards to remain on patrol.  A1024-25.  Without more, these facts
could not survive summary judgment on the causation issue.  Cf. Farrell v. Planters
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 283-84 (3d. Cir 2000) (causation inferred from dismissal
within one month of alleged incident, plus additional circumstances).  
In any event, Officer Baccone’s reassignments may not qualify as an “adverse
employment action.”  See Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995).  Based
on objective factors like hours, pay, benefits, and seniority, the new positions were
essentially the same as the patrol job.  A970-74.  See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120
F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (“retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough
to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”).  
4Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a protective order
precluding Bacone from conducting discovery into the Ferber case.  The events in
question occurred roughly twenty years ago, and the fruits of the investigation would
likely be prejudicial character evidence.  See Fed. Rule Evid. 404(b) (2004).  Evidence
that Commander Rosenstein engaged in investigational improprieties in the past would
lead a jury to the prohibited inference that his investigation of the Bacone allegations was
also tainted.  “This is the very evil that Rule 404(b) seeks to prevent.”  Becker v. ARCO
Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Morley, 199
F.3d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
Bacone remained free to show that the PHA’s investigation into his complaints
was tainted by pointing to any circumstances surrounding that event.  He was only barred
from conducting a temporally and factually unconnected inquiry that could easily devolve
into a confusing, time-wasting and misleading mini-trial.  See Red. Rule Evid. 403
(2004).  The District Judge’s decision easily passes muster under the abuse of discretion
standard.  See Camiolo v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 334 F.3d 345, 354 (3d Cir.
2003); Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1991).  The
District Court’s summary judgment and evidentiary Orders are therefore AFFIRMED. 
